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Abstract
We examine the impact of demographic structure, the proportion of
the population in each age group, on growth, savings, investment, hours,
interest rates and inflation using a panel VAR estimated from data for
20 OECD economies, mainly for the period 1970-2007. This flexible dy-
namic structure with interactions among the main macroeconomic vari-
ables allows us to estimate long-run effects of demographic structure on
the individual countries. Our estimates confirm the importance of these
effects.
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1 Introduction
Demographic structure, the proportion of the population in each age group,
matters for the economy. Different age groups have different savings behaviour,
according to the life-cycle hypothesis; different age groups have different pro-
ductivities, according to the age profile of wages; different age groups work
different amounts, the very young and very old tend not to work, with impli-
cations for labour input; and different age groups provide different investment
opportunities, as firms target their different needs. These adjustments of sav-
ings and investment in response to demographic changes will impact on real
interest rates.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the demographic structure of rich economies is chang-
ing. The average proportion of the population aged 60+ across our sample is
projected to increase from 16% in 1970 to 29%, with most of the corresponding
decline experienced in the 0− 19 group. Though the proportion of the popula-
tion in the “working age” group (20−59) is similar in the two years at 50% and
48% respectively, it initially increased to around 56% in 2003 before starting
to decline again. In this paper we wish to investigate the economic impact of
these dramatic changes in demographic structure using a panel VAR estimated
on data from 20 OECD countries over the last four decades. The endogenous
variables we consider are growth, investment, savings, hours worked, interest
rates and inflation. We consider a relatively wide range of variables and allow
for flexible dynamics to capture a range of possible macroeconomic adjustment
processes. There are other impacts of demographic structure that we do not
consider, such as the political economy issues of how societies adjust to the
tensions caused by having a large proportion of very old people to support.
While theoretical models, calibrated for instance on the age profile of savings,
and most economic commentary on policy strongly emphasize the importance
of demographic structure, the econometric evidence for its importance is less
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Figure 1: (Unweighted) Sample Mean Proportions in each Age Group by Year
(Source: United Nations, 2011)
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compelling. There are a number of reasons for this. Changes in demographic
structure are low frequency phenomena, difficult to distinguish from the other
low frequency trends that dominate economic time series. The vector of propor-
tions in each age group is inevitably highly collinear, making precise estimation
of the effect of each age group difficult. Hence it is common to impose very
strong restrictions on the effect of the age structure, for instance through the
use a single variable, the dependency ratio. Estimation of the coefficients of
low frequency collinear determinants will be inevitably sensitive to the exact
specification of the equations and the estimation method used. Endogeneity is
a serious problem because although the proportions in each age group are plau-
sibly exogenous (the high birth rate that produced the baby boomers after 1945
is unlikely to be influenced by growth rates 30 years later) the other variables
in the system are likely to be responding to the low frequency demographic im-
pacts, reducing the marginal contribution of the demographic variables. Finally,
general equilibrium effects are likely to be important, as other variables adjust.
In particular, crucial intervening variables in the transmission of demographic
structure to growth and savings are years in education; the age, sex and skill
specific labour force participation rates and pension wealth. Although there are
difficult measurement issues associated with each of these factors, all seem to
have shown large variations over our sample.
In this paper, we deal with these econometric issues by using a large panel of
OECD countries, over the period 1970-2007 for most countries, controlling for
the interaction between the main variables of interest. In particular, we ask how
much of the variation of long-run growth in these countries can be explained
by the evolution of their demographic structure, allowing for the interactions
between growth, savings, investment, aggregate labour supply, interest rates
and inflation. However, the lack of good comparable data on participation rates
means that we do not explicitly model this channel. We employ a panel VAR
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technique to uncover long-run association between key macroeconomic variables,
that are, real output, investment, savings, hours worked, nominal short term
interest rates, and price inflation, and the slowly changing demographic profile.
Although we provide a straightforward theoretical motivation for our analysis,
our objective is not to estimate a tight theoretical model; such a model would
need to abstract from a lot of considerations that our estimates show are im-
portant in practice and require strong identification assumptions. Rather, we
aim to provide estimates of the impact of demographic structure on the main
macroeconomic indicators that may help inform the development of the theory.
We first find that the changing age profile across OECD countries has eco-
nomically and statistically significant impact on real output growth, investment,
savings, hours worked, interest rates and inflation in both the long and short-run
next to autoregressive components and oil prices as control variables. When we
isolate direct and indirect long-run effects of the changing age profile on all vari-
ables of concern, we find that the impact is strong on all variables except for the
hours worked. We also find that the changing age profile impact roughly follows
a life-cycle patterns; that is dependant cohorts, in general, have negative impact
on real macroeconomic variables, and add positive inflationary pressures in the
long-run. Secondly, we test for the robustness of our results to the use of time
effects, exclusion of individual countries and structural breaks. We find that our
model with demographic transition is robust to time effects and exclusion of in-
dividual countries. However, while real output, investment, savings and hours
worked do not suffer from structural breaks, inflation and nominal interest rate
equations may do in the early 1990’s. Thirdly, we investigate the impact of the
baby-boomers entering the labour market in 1970’s and approaching retirement
in late 2000’s in individual countries. We find that given our model, Japan
should have been most affected by changes in age profile; including a very siz-
able negative adjustment in hours worked, while various other countries would
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have responded through an adjustment in hours worked. Fourthly, our model
suggests that, ceteris paribus, the changing age profile will have significant neg-
ative growth impact on future real output growth in the 2010-19 decade in our
sample. When compared to 2000-09 decade the decline in average annual real
output growth will range from .45% in Japan to 1.34 % in the U.S. Finally, we
find that our model with demographic structure cannot improve on a simple
random walk model in terms of forecast accuracy over the short-term, thought
it does improve on a VAR that excludes demographic variables, and provides
more accurate predictions for growth over the long term.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background. In
Section 2.1 we discuss related literature. Section 2.2 presents a stylized mo-
tivation on the impact of demographic transition a la Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007). Section 2.3 provides our econometric framework for the panel VAR.
Section 3 presents the panel VAR estimates and provides a series of robustness
tests. Section 4 presents results for individual countries. Section 5 presents the
out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of our model with demographic transition
changes vis-a-vis a simple random walk and the model without demographic
transition. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Literature
There is a large literature on the effects of demography, in particular the age
structure of the population, on macroeconomic variables, which arise through
life cycle influences on savings and the differences in productivity, arising from
the fact that different age groups have different participation rates and different
human capital. Standard macroeconomic theory is not helpful in this respect
because representative agent models, by definition, cannot allow for such effects,
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and overlapping generations models allow for them in quite a restricted way.
(See, for instance, Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1992).
Fair and Dominguez (1991) examine the effect of demographics on various
US macro variables. They have a careful discussion of the aggregation issues
and use a low order polynomial function for the coefficients of the vector of 55
age distribution shares. They find that the impact of US age distribution on
consumption, money demand, housing investment and labour force participa-
tion is highly significant. Higgins and Williamson (1997) study the dependency
hypothesis for Asia and argue that the significant increase in the Asian saving
rates can be explained by the significant decline in youth dependency ratios that
is associated with increased investment and reduced foreign capital dependency.
Higgins (1998) examines the relationship between age-distribution, savings in-
vestment and thus the current account for a panel of countries, using 5 year
averages for the variables. He also uses a low order polynomial function for the
coefficients of 15 age distribution shares. He shows that demographic effects,
i.e. increases in both youth and old-age dependency ratios, can explain differ-
ent levels of decline in savings and investments and increase in capital imports.
Miles (1999) has a careful discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the
use of different types of evidence to assess the impact of demographic change
and argues for the use of calibrated general equilibrium models. Acemoglu and
Johnson (2007) study a panel of 75 countries. They argue that increase in life
expectancy due to advancements in medicine against infectious diseases led to
a significant increase in population, as birth rates did not decline sufficiently to
compensate for the increase in life expectancy. They argue that the increases
in life expectancy (and the associated increases in population) appear to have
reduced income per capita. Bloom et al. (2007) find that inclusion of life ex-
pectancy and the initial working-age share improves per capita income growth
forecast performance for the period of 1980-2000 for a panel of 67 economies.
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(See also Bloom et al., 2010, and references therein.) Jaimovich and Siu (2009)
examine the impact of demography on business cycle volatility in the G7 coun-
tries. The young and old have more volatile hours and employment than the
prime-age workforce and thus an increasing share of prime-age workforce may
have contributed to the great moderation. Park (2010) examines the impact of
age distribution on stock market price-earnings ratios in the US, using a Fourier
flexible form, rather than a polynomial.
Go´mez and He´rnandez de Cos (2008) find that the proportions of ‘mature’
(15-64 year olds) and ‘prime age’ (34-54 year olds) people in the population can
explain more than half of global growth since 1960, and that ‘maturation’ is
also responsible for the continuing divergence of rich and poor countries as age
structure in the former has improved more dramatically than in the latter.
With the exception of Fair and Dominguez (1991), studies mentioned so far
take the issue of aging population either as a change in the ratio of working age
population in an economy (or dependency ratios) or as the aggregate impact of
changes in life expectancy. In contrast, Lindh and Malmberg (1999) consider
age structure in a transitional growth regression on a panel of 5-year periods in
OECD countries. They find that growth of GDP per worker is strongly influ-
enced by the age structure, with 50-64 year olds having a positive influence and
the 65-plus age group a negative one. Feyrer (2007) considers the age struc-
ture of the workforce, rather than the population as a whole, and its impact on
productivity and hence output. He also finds a strong demographic effect, with
the 40-50 year age-group having the most positive impact. Our approach differs
from these in three significant ways: first, we consider one-year periods rather
than 5-year ones, and can hence adopt a panel time-series approach to estima-
tion. Second, we allow for interaction effects between a number of important
macro-variables by estimating a VAR rather than an individual equation. And
third, we make no assumptions about the underlying economic processes and
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hence impose less structure on the data.
2.2 Theoretical Motivation
We closely follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) approach in providing a justifi-
cation for the role of dynamic interactions between the variables of interest and
the evolution of the demographic profile.1 Suppose that the economy i has the
following production function:
Yit = (AitHit)
α
Kβit, (1)
where α+β ≤ 1, Yi denotes output produced, Ki denotes capital and Hi denotes
the effective units of labour given by Hit = hiNi, where hi is the human capital
per person and Ni is the total population. Let us assume that changes in the
age profile may affect output via changes in the human capital accumulation or
via technology.
To accommodate these possible age related impacts we assume the following
isoelastic relationships:
Ait = A¯i
7∑
j=0
w
γj
ji,t, (2)
hit = h¯i
7∑
j=0
w
ηj
ji,t, (3)
where A¯i and h¯i represent the baseline differences across countries, wji,t denote
the share of age group j = 0, 1, . . . 7, (between 0-9, 10-19, ..,70 and over), in
total population. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) , and taking logarithms we
obtain the following specification for per capita income yit = log
(
Yit
Nit
)
:
yit = α log A¯i+α log h¯i−(1−α) logNit+β logKit+α
7∑
j=0
(γj + ηj) logwji,t. (4)
As the capital stock will likely adjust to changes in the demographic structure
in the long run we would like to control for this. Controlling for the depreciation
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of capital by δ and economy-wide saving rate by si, we write the evolution of
capital as:
Kit+1 = sitYit + (1− δ)Kit
At the steady state, the capital stock will be given by Ki =
siYi
δ
. Substituting
this value into (4) we have a long term relationship between the changes in
the demographic structure (the age profile), key macroeconomic variables and
per-capita real output:
yit =
α
1− β log A¯i +
α
1− β log h¯i −
(1− α)
1− β logNit +
β
1− β log si
− β
1− β log δ +
α
1− β
7∑
j=0
(γj + ηj) logwji,t. (5)
The model outlined so far is for a closed economy, in which savings is equal to
investment. In open economies this need not be the case, even in the presence of
home bias and Feldstein-Horioka effects. (See for instance Bai and Zhang, 2010).
Thus in our econometric model we will include both savings and investment.
2.3 Data and econometric model
The annual dataset covers the period 1970-2007. The demographic data was
obtained from the United Nations (2011). The annual data on savings and
investment rates were calculated from Nominal GDP, Investment and Savings
series obtained from the OECD (2010), which also supplied the data on hours
worked. Annual data on policy rates and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) were
obtained from the IMF (2010). Per-capita GDP growth rates were calculated
from per-capita real GDP obtained from Penn World Tables (Heston et al.,
2009).
The twenty countries covered by the data are: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United
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Kingdom, United States. For some countries there data is not available over
the whole period, so the panel is unbalanced. Data on hours are only available
for Austria from 1995-2007, for Greece from 1983-2007 and for Portugal from
1986-2007. Savings and investment rates for Switzerland are only available from
1990-2007. All other countries have full datasets.
Though it would also be desirable to include Germany, Spain and Turkey as
mature OECD economies, we exclude Germany due to reunification and Spain
and Turkey due to incomplete demographic data.
We have data for countries, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , for years t = 1, 2, ..., T. For
data on age structure Park (2010) uses age by year, and restricts the shape
of their effect, but given the lack of data for many countries we use age by
decade. With only 7 demographic proportions and a fairly large panel we chose
not to restrict the age coefficients. Denote the share of age group j = 0, 1, ..7
(0− 9, 10− 19, . . . , 70+) in total population by wjit and suppose the effect on
the variable of interest, say xit, takes the form
xit = α+
7∑
j=0
δjwji,t + uit.
Since
∑7
j=0 wjit = 1, there is exact collinearity if all the demographic shares
are included. To deal with this, we restrict the coefficients to sum to 0, use
(wji,t − w7i,t) as explanatory variables and recover the coefficient of the oldest
age group from δ7 = −
∑6
j=0 δj . We denote the 7 element vector of (wji,t−w7i,t)
as Wit.
The six endogenous variables of the system are the growth rate of the real
GDP, yit, the share of investment in GDP, Iit, the share of personal savings in
GDP, Sit, the logarithms of hours worked Hit, the nominal short interest rate,
Rit and the rate of inflation piit. We denote the vector of these six variables as
Yit = (yit, Iit, Sit, Hit, Rit, piit)′. As exogenous variables we have Wit and two
lags of the logarithm of the real oil price.2
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There are likely to be complicated dynamic interactions between the six eco-
nomic variables and there is relatively little literature suggesting an appropriate
model for panel data. For instance Bond et al. (2010) consider the relationship
between yit and Iit in detail, but one may also expect interaction with the other
variables because of the other theoretical linkages discussed above.
Ideally one would like to estimate an identified structural system between
these six variables allowing for expectations. Suppose, ignoring oil prices, that
such a structural system took the form;
Φ0Yt = Φ1Et(Yt+1) + Φ2Yt−1 + ΓWt + εt. (6)
Then there is a unique and stationary solution if all the eigenvalues of A and
(I − Φ1A)−1Φ1 lie strictly inside the unit circle, where A solves the quadratic
matrix equation
Φ1A2 − Φ0A+ Φ2 = 0. (7)
In that case the solution is
Yt = AYt−1 + Φ−10 ΓWt + Φ
−1
0 εt. (8)
Identifying the structural system is likely to be difficult, If there are m
endogenous variables, identifying (6) requires 2m2 identifying restrictions (see
the discussion in Koop et al., 2011; Komunjer and Ng, 2011). Therefore we
estimate the solution or reduced form of such a structural system and assume
that conditional on the exogenous variables it can be written as a VAR, like
(8). Notice that since A will be a complicated function of all the structural
parameters, as (7) makes clear, it may be difficult to interpret the coefficients.
However, our objective is primarily to provide predictions of the long-run effect
of the demographic variables and the same predictions would be obtained from
any just identified structural model as from (8) . Over-identifying restrictions, if
available and correct, would increase the efficiency of the estimation, but given
that we have a large panel that seems a secondary consideration.
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We allow for intercept heterogeneity through ai but assume slope homo-
geneity and estimate a one way fixed effect augmented panel VAR(2) of the
form:
Yit = ai +A1Yi,t−1 +A2Yi,t−2 +DWit + uit,
plus two lags of the oil price. D is the 6 × 7 matrix of coefficients of the
demographic variables. Our estimate of the effect of the demographic variables
is then the marginal effect after having controlled for lagged Yit and the oil price
Implicitly we are assuming either that all the variables are stationary or that a
flexible unrestricted VAR will capture stationary combinations by differencing
or cointegrating linear combinations. Bond et al. (2010) discuss this issue with
respect to the investment share and Phillips and Moon (1999) and Coakley et al.
(2006) suggest that spurious regression may be less of a problem in panels.
Slope heterogeneity is undoubtedly important and it can have unfortunate
consequences in dynamic panels. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that it biases
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable towards one and the coefficient
of the exogenous variable towards zero, though these two biases may offset
each other in the calculation of the long-run effects, the focus of our interest.
However, we adopt a fixed effect estimator which imposes slope homogeneity
across countries, partly because we are estimating 21 slope parameters and
partly because the demographic variables show very low frequency variation
relative to annual time-series and the elements are highly correlated. Thus
heterogeneous estimates based on relatively few degrees of freedom may be
poorly determined and likely to produce outliers. We found this to be the case
when we experimented with VARs for each country. In addition, Baltagi and
Griffin (1997) and Baltagi et al. (2000) show that the homogeneous estimators
tend to have better forecasting properties. Thus since our main aim is to predict
the variables conditional on demographics, the homogeneous estimators may
provide better predictors of this demographic contribution.
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The long-run moving equilibrium for system is then given by:
Y ∗it = (I −A1 −A2)−1 ai + (I −A1 −A2)−1DWit,
where the effect of the demographic variables is given by (I −A1 −A2)−1D
which reflects both the direct effect of demographics on each variable and the
feedback between the endogenous variables. This allows, for instance, the effects
of demography on savings to influence growth through the effect of savings on
growth. We can isolate the long-run contribution of demography to each variable
in each country by:
Y Dit = (I −A1 −A2)−1DWit. (9)
This is the demographic attractor for the economic variables at any moment in
time. Notice this is a long-run estimate in the very specific sense of being the
long run forecast for the economic variables conditional on a particular vector
of demographic shares after the completion of the endogenous adjustment of
the economic variables. But over time the shares would also change as people
get older, so this is not a long-run steady state which would also allow for the
extra adjustment of the demographic shares to their equilibrium, which we do
not model. We will examine the movements of elements of this vector, Y Dit , over
time to indicate the low frequency contribution of demographics to the evolution
of a particular variable in a particular country.
3 Panel VAR estimates
We chose between possible specifications on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian
information criterion, SBC. On that basis, a one way fixed effect model with
country intercepts was preferred for every equation to a two way fixed effect
model with country and year intercepts, but without the oil price. This suggests
that cross-section dependence or common trends is not a major problem with
the model, but we investigate the robustness of our results to this below. A
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VAR(1) and a VAR(2) had almost identical SBCs. We used a VAR(2) to allow
for more flexible dynamics and to deal with potential non-stationarity. Full
estimates are given in an appendix Tables 10 and 11, together with HAC robust
standard errors.
We report below, in Table 1, the A1 +A2 matrix, where each row represents
an equation in the panel VAR representation. We note that hours are highly
persistent and investment, savings, nominal interest rates and inflation rate are
moderately so. There is evidence that all our endogenous variables are Granger
causal for some other variables in the system, except in the case of savings
which is not a significant influence on any other variable. Lagged growth signif-
icantly influences all the variables except savings and interest rates. Investment
significantly influences growth, inflation and savings. Hours significantly influ-
ences interest rates and inflation. Interest rates significantly influence growth,
investment and hours. Inflation significantly influences interest rates. Oil prices
significantly influence everything except investment. Perhaps the most surpris-
ing feature is that lagged investment has a negative effect on growth, though
as noted below there is a strong positive contemporaneous correlation between
the growth and investment residuals. For OECD countries Bond et al. (2010)
found a small positive effect in the bivariate relationship. The nominal interest
rate has a negative effect on all the other variables, and although inflation has a
positive effect, the coefficients are very small, indicating that this is not picking
up a real interest rate effect.
Table 2 gives the D matrix of short term demographic impacts on the six
variables. As expected the individual coefficients are not well determined be-
cause of collinearity, but the hypothesis that the coefficients of the demographic
variables are all zero is strongly rejected for all equations except hours worked
(see tables 10 and 11). One would expect demographic structure to have sig-
nificant impacts on hours worked and the fact that it does not may be because
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there are offsetting adjustments in labour force participation rates. Generally
the results look plausible, though there are some unexpected results. For in-
stance there seems to be a negative effect of the 30-39 age group on growth and
a positive effect of teenagers on savings and 60-70 years cohort on investment.
Table 3 gives the (I −A1 −A2)−1D matrix. Allowing for the dynamics
and interactions makes a strong difference, the long-run effects are much larger.
The effect on hours is particularly marked, perhaps because these are highly
persistent.
Table 4 gives the matrix of correlations between the residuals of each equa-
tion of the VAR. There are very strong contemporaneous correlations between
the residuals of some of the equations, perhaps reflecting business cycle effects.
The correlation coefficient between the residuals from the growth equation and
the residuals from the investment equation is .54, the savings equation .45 and
the hours equation .43. These are the three largest correlations. All the correla-
tions are positive, except for a very small negative correlation between savings
and interest rates.
3.1 Robustness to the use of time effects
As mentioned above the model chosen using SBC assumes one-way fixed ef-
fects and includes oil prices as a measure of technology shocks across countries.
One potential drawback of this approach concerns trends: if there are shared,
cross-country, factors driving the trend in the dependent variable as well as
the demographic variables, this trend may be wrongly attributed to the demo-
graphic variables in the one-way, country, fixed effect model. A two-way effects
model avoids this issue by removing any common cross-country factors from all
variables prior to estimation.
Table 5 shows the long-term impact of demographic variables under a two-
way fixed effects model. Comparison with Table 3 reveals that though the
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impact does change significantly for inflation, hours and savings, the impact on
GDP growth is remarkably robust to the chosen effect. We conclude that the
impact of demographic variables on growth and investment identified by the
model is not merely a spurious correlation.
3.2 Robustness to exclusion of individual countries
We test the robustness with respect to the selected countries by re-estimating
the model on a dataset with each country excluded in turn. The results are
very stable with respect to these exclusions, as are the tests as to whether the
demographic variables are significant in each equation.
3.3 Structural Change
We also test for potential structural change by estimating the model on sub-
periods of the entire dataset, and selecting the preferred model using the SBC.
A single model over the whole period was preferred over models with structural
breaks in any given year for the first four equations in the VAR - growth,
investment, savings and hours worked. For the last two equations, interest rates
and inflation, models with breaks in 1992 and 1989 respectively were optimal
under the SBC.
Estimating the model over two subsets spanning 1970-1990 and 1990-2007
respectively yields results that differ from the full-period estimation as well as
each other, indicating the possible presence of structural instability. The ranges
of the demographic variables for the two periods are also somewhat different,
however, and the second period has a vastly reduced variation in interest rates
since the euro member countries in our sample shared a common rate for much
of the period.
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4 Impact on individual countries
We now consider what light our results shed on the question of whether the baby
boomers squandered the demographic dividend. For this purpose we conduct
a counterfactual analysis. Table 6 shows, for the countries with available data,
the impact on the six variables of the change in demographic structure between
1970, when the baby boomers were entering the labour market and 2007, when
they were approaching retirement. This is calculated using equation (9) and the
long-run estimates from the one way fixed effect model.
The estimated impact of demographic changes on GDP varies across coun-
tries, but given our model 2007 real GDP growth would have been 2.91% less
for Japan as compared to 1970 and .69% less for the U.S. In general, given our
estimated model Japan in 2007, as compared to 1970, would have been most af-
fected by the changes in the age profile, as all variables would have been sizably
depressed including the hours worked. It appears, that given our model, while
in various countries there would have been some form of contrarian adjustment
in the hours worked as a response to demographic pressures, Japanese and, to
a limited extent, Finnish and Swedish labour markets would not have followed
such a pattern.
Interestingly, the estimated impact of demographic changes on both the in-
terest rate and inflation is strongly negative and of quite similar orders of mag-
nitude, consistent with real interest rate effects. Since the 1970s were the decade
when the baby boomers entered the labour force, we might have expected the
supply side effect to be deflationary, the arrival of such a large cohort depress-
ing wages, but the demand side effects might have been inflationary. Although
both interest rates and inflation did tend to be higher around 1970 than in
2007, the change over the period is not as large as predicted by demographic
factors. However, the two way fixed effects estimates above suggest that the
demographic effects on these two variables might be overstated.
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The estimated model can also be applied to the predicted future demographic
structure. Using both historic data and forecasts for the demographic structure,
Table 7 provides forecasts of the average impact of demographic structure on
average annual per-capita GDP growth over the current decade, and compares it
to that over 2000-2009. It suggests that in all countries in our sample, as well as
Germany, the impact of demographic factors over this decade will put downward
pressure on GDP growth. The magnitude of this pressure is economically highly
significant: for the US, for example, it is −1.34%.
5 Forecasting Accuracy
An important measure of the usefulness of any economic model is the degree
to which it can forecast future events. With this in mind we re-estimated the
model using the data available up to 1997 and used that model to forecast the
path of the economy over the following ten years, 1997-2007. As a baseline we
also performed a random walk forecast for each variable.
Table 8 presents the results from a series of 1-year-ahead forecasts, where
period t realised values are used to forecasts period t + 1 outcomes. The VAR
model forecasts are less accurate than those from the baseline model. Adding
demographic variables to the VAR provides slightly better accuracy in this sam-
ple for all variables other than savings and hours worked, but does not improve
on the random walk.
Table 9 presents results from 10 year rolling forecasts. Here, the forecasts
for the current year are used as inputs to forecast the next year, as would be
required of a long-range forecaster. Again the random walk model provides more
accurate forecasts in most cases, though for both growth and hours worked the
error of the cumulative forecast over the 10 year period is markedly lower for
the VAR models. The demographic variables improve the forecasts of inflation
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and interest rates over the VAR without demographics, but do not outperform
the random walk.
6 Conclusions
The use of a panel VAR in six main macroeconomic variables, for 20 OECD
countries over the period 1970-2007 allows us to obtain estimates of the long-run
impact of demographic structure on the economy. Our results indicate that the
age profile of the population has both economically and statistically significant
impact on the key economic indicators studied. This impact also appears to
be robust to various changes in the model and dataset. The magnitude of
the impact is such that demographic factors are predicted to depress average
annual GDP growth over the current decade, 2010-2019, at .94% in our sample
of OECD countries, with the strongest predicted negative impact in the US at
1.34%. We find that our model with demographic structure cannot improve on
a simple random walk model in terms of forecast accuracy over the short-term,
thought it does improve on a VAR that excludes demographic variables, and
provides more accurate predictions for growth over the long term.
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Notes
1Note that while Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) develop a relationship be-
tween increased life expectancy and its impact on real output, we focus on the
impact of a changing age profile on real output and other macro variables.
2In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting, savings (hence con-
sumption) should be subject to both substitution and wealth (income) effects.
In our savings analysis we include nominal short term policy rates and inflation
to capture intertemporal consumption preferences. We also experimented with
a specification with two measures of wealth (financial and housing) to capture
the wealth effects. The data for this was taken from Slacalek (2009) and was
only available for a sub-sample of the data we use. On the sub-sample, the
Schwarz Bayesian information criterion indicated that the specification exclud-
ing wealth gives a better fit, therefore the main analysis is performed on the full
range of data and excludes wealth.
References
Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson (2007), “Disease and Development: The Ef-
fect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth.”, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 115 (6), 925–985.
Auerbach, A. and L. Kotlikoff (1992), “The impact of the demographic tran-
sition on capital formation.”, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 281–
295.
Bai, Y. and J. Zhang (2010), “Solving the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle with finan-
cial frictions.”, Econometrica 78 (2), 603–632.
21
Baltagi, B. and J. Griffin (1997), “Pooled estimators vs. their heterogeneous
counterparts in the context of dynamic demand for gasoline.”, Journal of
Econometrics 77 (2), 303–327.
Baltagi, B., J. Griffin, and W. Xiong (2000), “To pool or not to pool: Homoge-
neous versus heterogeneous estimators applied to cigarette demand.”, Review
of Economics and Statistics 82 (1), 117–126.
Bloom, D., D. Canning, and G. Fink (2010), “Implications of population ageing
for economic growth.”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 26 (4), 583–612.
Bloom, D., D. Canning, G. Fink, and J. Finlay (2007), “Does age structure
forecast economic growth?.”, International Journal of Forecasting 23 (4), 569–
585.
Bond, S., A. Leblebiciolu, and F. Schiantarelli (2010), “Capital accumulation
and growth: a new look at the empirical evidence.”, Journal of Applied
Econometrics 25 (7), 1073–1099.
Coakley, J., A. Fuertes, and R. Smith (2006), “Unobserved heterogeneity in
panel time series models.”, Computational Statistics & Data Analysis 50 (9),
2361–2380.
Fair, R. and K. Dominguez (1991), “Effects of the Changing US Age Distri-
bution on Macroeconomic Equations.”, The American Economic Review ,
1276–1294.
Feyrer, J. (2007), “Demographics and productivity.”, The Review of Economics
and Statistics 89 (1), 100–109.
Go´mez, R. and P. He´rnandez de Cos (2008), “The importance of being mature:
the effect of demographic maturation on global per capita GDP.”, Journal of
population economics 21 (3), 589–608.
22
Heston, A., R. Summers, and B. Aten (2009, August), “Penn World Table
Version 6.3.”, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income
and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.
Higgins, M. (1998), “Demography, National Savings, and International Capital
Flows.”, International Economic Review 39 (2), pp. 343–369.
Higgins, M. and J. G. Williamson (1997), “Age Structure Dynamics in Asia and
Dependence on Foreign Capital.”, Population and Development Review 23 (2),
pp. 261–293.
IMF (2010), “International Financial Statistics.”, ESDS International, Univer-
sity of Manchester .
Jaimovich, N. and H. Siu (2009), “The Young, the Old, and the Restless: Demo-
graphics and Business Cycle Volatility.”, American Economic Review 99 (3),
804–826.
Komunjer, I. and S. Ng (2011), “Dynamic Identification of Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium Models.”, Econometrica 79 (6), 1995–2032.
Koop, G., M. Pesaran, and R. Smith (2011), On identification of Bayesian
DSGE models. CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for eco-
nomic research.
Lindh, T. and B. Malmberg (1999), “Age structure effects and growth in the
OECD, 1950–1990.”, Journal of Population Economics 12 (3), 431–449.
Miles, D. (1999), “Modelling the Impact of Demographic Change upon the
Economy.”, The Economic Journal 109 (452), pp. 1–36.
OECD (2010), “Annual National Accounts.”, ESDS International, University
of Manchester .
23
Park, C. (2010), “How does changing age distribution impact stock prices? a
nonparametric approach.”, Journal of Applied Econometrics 25 (7), 1155–
1178.
Pesaran, M. and R. Smith (1995), “Estimating Long-run relationships from
Dynamic Heterogenous Panels.”, Journal of Econometrics 68, 79–113.
Phillips, P. and H. Moon (1999), “Linear regression limit theory for nonstation-
ary panel data.”, Econometrica 67 (5), 1057–1111.
Slacalek, J. (2009), “What Drives Personal Consumption? The Role of Housing
and Financial Wealth..”, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 9 (1).
United Nations (2011), “World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision.”,
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Di-
vision.
24
y I S H R pi
y 0.27 -0.26 0.01 0.01 -0.29 -0.00
I 0.18 0.73 0.00 0.03 -0.11 0.01
S -0.11 -0.14 0.78 -0.00 -0.11 0.03
H 0.24 -0.08 -0.00 0.93 -0.14 0.03
R 0.21 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.75 0.05
pi 0.38 0.18 0.07 -0.02 -0.16 0.72
Table 1: Sum of VAR coefficients A1 +A2
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δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
y -0.03 0.21 0.18 -0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.00 -0.40
I 0.06 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.23 -0.32
S -0.06 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.03 -0.56
H -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.09 -0.31
R 0.16 0.04 -0.04 -0.18 -0.09 0.07 0.22 -0.19
pi 0.46 0.10 -0.14 -0.45 -0.26 -0.04 0.18 0.14
Table 2: Short run Demographic impacts. δ8 is derived from restrictions as
described in section 2.3.
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δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
y -0.20 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.08 -0.04 -0.33 0.06
I -0.21 -0.16 0.43 0.23 0.30 0.11 0.32 -1.01
S -0.19 0.52 -0.25 0.39 0.42 0.78 -0.12 -1.56
H -1.09 -0.44 0.54 1.95 0.63 0.81 -1.02 -1.37
R 0.54 0.31 0.03 -0.58 -0.30 0.23 0.51 -0.73
pi 0.98 0.53 -0.21 -1.00 -0.38 -0.11 0.15 0.04
Table 3: Long-Run Demographic Impact
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y I S H R pi
y 1.00 0.54 0.45 0.43 0.20 0.28
I 0.54 1.00 0.01 0.29 0.11 0.20
S 0.45 0.01 1.00 0.25 -0.01 0.06
H 0.43 0.29 0.25 1.00 0.19 0.16
R 0.20 0.11 -0.01 0.19 1.00 0.28
pi 0.28 0.20 0.06 0.16 0.28 1.00
Table 4: Residual Correlation Matrix
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δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4 δ5 δ6 δ7 δ8
y -0.24 0.25 0.07 0.12 0.11 -0.04 -0.30 0.03
I -0.32 -0.25 0.38 0.20 0.53 0.06 0.54 -1.15
S -0.08 0.91 -0.01 0.44 0.21 0.25 0.05 -1.77
H -1.53 -0.07 0.48 2.12 0.94 0.46 -0.68 -1.72
R 0.48 0.12 -0.10 -0.70 0.03 0.39 0.18 -0.41
pi 0.38 0.39 -0.42 -0.69 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 0.54
Table 5: Long-Run Demographic Impact in a Model with Two-way Fixed Effects
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y I S H R pi
Australia -0.38 -0.17 -4.34 7.87 -7.99 -11.47
Austria 1.37 -0.42 -0.85 11.99 -9.20 -11.71
Belgium 0.17 -2.90 -4.98 4.16 -7.08 -7.25
Canada -1.13 0.62 -3.45 11.13 -9.64 -15.07
Denmark -0.46 -1.77 -1.89 1.63 -5.50 -6.39
Finland -1.72 -4.76 -9.01 -4.02 -7.25 -7.00
France -0.27 -2.62 -4.69 3.68 -6.31 -7.02
Germany 0.96 -3.88 -6.77 2.22 -9.66 -8.83
Greece 0.21 -3.54 -9.87 4.92 -11.07 -11.66
Iceland -0.18 2.37 -0.78 16.00 -8.73 -14.69
Ireland 0.83 5.01 0.82 23.96 -9.91 -17.17
Italy 0.10 -5.45 -10.37 1.16 -11.76 -11.15
Japan -2.91 -10.22 -17.47 -16.80 -9.98 -7.00
Netherlands -0.76 -0.83 -2.11 6.21 -7.81 -10.88
New Zealand 0.02 0.88 -2.84 11.38 -9.04 -13.34
Norway 0.45 0.09 -0.81 9.17 -6.78 -9.15
Portugal 0.15 -1.97 -8.85 10.49 -13.27 -16.41
Sweden -0.06 -3.19 -4.80 -1.41 -5.44 -4.44
Switzerland 0.20 -2.68 -3.19 3.61 -8.35 -9.10
United Kingdom 0.90 -1.40 -4.06 5.38 -7.42 -8.10
United States -0.69 0.82 -2.43 9.20 -6.49 -10.09
Table 6: Difference in Predicted Impact of Demographic Factors between 2007
and 1970 (in percentage points, except H where it is a percentage).
This was calculated by applying the estimated long-run demographic coefficients to the de-
mographic structure in each country as it was in 1970 and in 2007, and subtracting the result of
the former from the latter.
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2000 - 2009 2010 - 2019 Change
Australia 1.91 0.89 -1.02
Austria 1.62 0.94 -0.68
Belgium 1.38 0.35 -1.04
Canada 2.13 0.47 -1.66
Denmark 0.75 0.28 -0.47
Finland 0.97 -0.36 -1.34
France 1.50 0.32 -1.18
Germany 0.93 0.41 -0.52
Greece 1.48 0.69 -0.79
Iceland 2.24 1.01 -1.23
Ireland 2.19 0.97 -1.21
Italy 1.05 0.49 -0.56
Japan 0.34 -0.10 -0.45
Netherlands 1.33 0.26 -1.07
NewZealand 1.97 0.77 -1.19
Norway 1.55 0.57 -0.97
Portugal 1.40 0.86 -0.55
Sweden 1.14 0.20 -0.94
Switzerland 1.57 0.70 -0.86
UnitedKingdom 1.45 0.64 -0.81
UnitedStates 1.97 0.63 -1.34
Table 7: Average Predicted Impact on GDP Growth by Country, in percentage
points.
These results were calculated by applying estimated long-run demographic impacts on growth to
the demographic structure of the population each year, and averaging the results over each period.
The latter period is based on demographic forecasts from United Nations (2011).
We use the long-run impact to allow for interaction effects; the same calculation with short-run
impacts also yields suggests a strongly negative development in GDP growth in all cases other
than Norway.
31
RW a Without Demographics With Demographics
RMSEb RMSE bias corr.c cum.corr.d RMSE bias corr. cum.corr.
y 0.020 0.029 0.011 0.209 0.189 0.025 -0.000 0.320 0.420
I 0.012 0.014 0.003 0.878 0.925 0.013 -0.001 0.884 0.930
S 0.016 0.020 0.003 0.942 0.990 0.032 -0.010 0.828 0.859
H 0.016 0.014 0.001 0.373 0.492 0.017 -0.006 0.353 0.584
R 0.013 0.021 0.006 0.708 0.763 0.019 -0.001 0.725 0.792
pi 0.011 0.039 0.014 0.233 0.253 0.032 0.006 0.130 0.110
a The baseline random-walk model
b Root mean square error
c The correlation between forecast and actual outcomes
d The correlation between the sum of forecast and actual outcomes over the entire period; since
each cumulative outcome is the outcome for a single country, this indicates how well the model
forecasts cross-country differences.
Table 8: 1-Year-Ahead Forecast, 1997-2007
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RW a Without Demographics With Demographics
RMSEb cum. RMSEc RMSE cum. RMSE RMSE cum. RMSE
y 0.028 0.022 0.027 0.013 0.026 0.013
I 0.025 0.019 0.042 0.032 0.041 0.031
S 0.031 0.023 0.079 0.053 0.076 0.054
H 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.017 0.007
R 0.028 0.023 0.050 0.044 0.039 0.028
pi 0.016 0.012 0.074 0.072 0.034 0.028
a The baseline random-walk model
b Root mean square error
c The root mean square error of the cumulative forecast over the entire period
Table 9: Rolling Forecast, 1997-2007
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Growth (y) Investment (I) Savings (S)
Estimate Std. Error(a) Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
yt−1 0.26 0.05 * 0.13 0.04 * -0.07 0.07
It−1 -0.31 0.11 * 0.92 0.07 * 0.06 0.08
St−1 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.99 0.05 *
Ht−1 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04
Rt−1 -0.22 0.09 * -0.09 0.03 * -0.05 0.05
pit−1 -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03
yt−2 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03 * -0.04 0.04
It−2 0.06 0.11 -0.19 0.05 * -0.20 0.08 *
St−2 -0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.21 0.07 *
Ht−2 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.04
Rt−2 -0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.04
pit−2 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
POILt−1 -0.02 0.01 * 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 *
POILt−2 0.02 0.01 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
δ1 -0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.07
δ2 0.21 0.10 * -0.04 0.05 0.14 0.05 *
δ3 0.18 0.07 * 0.09 0.03 * 0.02 0.06
δ4 -0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.10 0.08
δ5 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.07
δ6 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.21 0.11
δ7 -0.00 0.14 0.23 0.10 * 0.03 0.10
R2 0.29 0.87 0.82
Pr(δj = 0)(b) 0.00 0.00 0.00
obs 630 630 630
(a) The entries marked with a ∗ are significant at the 5% level.
(b) This row reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation.
Table 10: Results for Growth, Investment and Savings
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Hours (H) Interest Rate (R) Inflation (pi)
Estimate Std. Error(a) Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
yt−1 0.20 0.04 * 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.08 *
It−1 0.00 0.09 -0.18 0.17 -0.39 0.17 *
St−1 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.18
Ht−1 1.12 0.05 * 0.28 0.05 * 0.15 0.08
Rt−1 -0.14 0.03 * 0.36 0.17 * -0.12 0.15
pit−1 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.54 0.22 *
yt−2 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.09
It−2 -0.08 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.58 0.40
St−2 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.09
Ht−2 -0.19 0.04 * -0.24 0.05 * -0.16 0.08 *
Rt−2 -0.00 0.03 0.38 0.21 -0.04 0.12
pit−2 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.03 * 0.19 0.05 *
POILt−1 -0.01 0.00 * -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 *
POILt−2 0.01 0.00 * 0.01 0.00 * 0.02 0.01 *
δ1 -0.01 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.46 0.18 *
δ2 -0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.16
δ3 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.14 0.13
δ4 0.09 0.06 -0.18 0.12 -0.45 0.22 *
δ5 0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.11 -0.26 0.20
δ6 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.15 -0.04 0.21
δ7 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.29
R2 0.92 0.73 0.75
Pr(δj = 0)(b) 0.10 0.00 0.00
obs 630 630 630
(a) The entries marked with a ∗ are significant at the 5% level.
(b) This row reports the joint significance of the 7 demographic variables in the equation.
Table 11: Results for Hours, Interest Rate and Inflation
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